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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL H. POWELL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant. 
vs 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
s. TONY COX, Director, 
Driver License Division, 
Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 
Case No. 16660 
Defendant/Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This proceeding involves a claim by appellant that the 
revocation of his driving privileges for refusing to submit to 
a chemical test is erroneous. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock found that appellant had 
not submitted to a breathalyzer test as requested by the arresting 
officer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the trial court 
affirmed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts as presented by appellant paint a slanted and. 
than clear picture of the total circumstances when appellant was 
arrested. Appellant attempts to show that he satisfied the statu: 
by lighting the green light. A more careful viewing of the facts 
will actually show though that appellant did refuse to submit to, 
test pursuant to the statute and this Court's standards. 
Upon being arrested and being instructed that he must 
take the breathalyzer test or lose his license for a year, the 
appellant initially refused to take the test. (R. 22, 23.) It 
was only until after a telephone conversation that appellant had•. 
his attorney that he finnaly submitted in part to the testing 
procedure. (R. 23, 24.) 
Once the appellant placed the mouthpiece of the breathal1. 
into his mouth, the record shows that he was pretending to be 
blowing, that he put his tongue over the hole of the mouthpiece 
and produced only short puffs, and that all the while the appellar.: 
kept faking blowing into the machine. He refused to follow the 
officer's instructions. The events as they transpired are explaine: 
by the arresting officer on Direct. (R. 25-27.) 
A. Officer Curtis instructed Mr. Powell that what he 
had to do, he brought the hose out, showed up the mouthpiece, 
said what he needed to do was give him a deep lung air sample· 
Q. Are those his exact words? 
A. 1 d He said that To the best of my know e ge, yes. 
frequently the word, deep lung a
ir sample." 
"deep air sample, 
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Q. Did he demonstrate where that air was to come from? 
A. I could not recall. During the test he placed his 
hands on his back in an effort to kind of indicate that he had 
to squeeze out some air. But I cannot recall any other gesture. 
Q. Okay. Did you see Mr. Powell blow into the machine? 
A. I saw him look like he was going to blow into the 
machine. 
Q. What did he do? Describe his physical action. 
A. He placed the mouthpiece in his mouth and kind-a 
made a move like he was blowing, like that. (Indicating) 
But het [yet] I heard no air going through the hose. 
Q. Did he purse up his lips? 
A. Yes, somewhat. I assume you mean by that kind of 
blow them out like there was air in there. 
Q. Okay. The first time that he made that agreement did 
the green light go on? 
A. No, it did not. 
Q. Did Officer Curtis give any explanation about that 
light or what it meant or did not mean? 
A. No, he did not. He just says basically he wanted 
him to blow the green light out, which is just a little inspira-
tion. And then we wanted him just to blow in there as far as 
~can, and we indicated that to him. 
Q. Did he explain to him how hard he needed to blow in 
order to give him the deep air sample that he requested? 
-3-
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A. More or less. He kept saying, "We've got to have a 
deep air sample. We've got to blow hard into it. T k a e yo.!::. 
tongue off it. Just blow free into the machine. Blow down 
until it feels deep." 
Q. Did he ever do that? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. Okay. After the first time, you described him blowr 
the first time, did he attempt a second time? 
A. Yes, he did. To my memory, it was several times. 
Officer Mel Curtis and the rest of us kept urging him to blow 
in the machine, telling him to take his tongue off it. And 
he kept making with this action. Finally I did hear a small 
amount of air go in there, and the green light did come in. 
THE COURT: This green light did come on? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it did. 
Q. (By Mr. Hale) Okay. After that light went on, did 
Officer Curtis administering the test ask for another breath 
sample with more air? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did he say to Mr. Powell? 
YOU A. Said, "You haven't given us a deep lung sample._ 
made the light go on, but we need more than. Keep blowinq 
harder." Some words to that effect. 
-4-
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Q. What did Mr. Powell say to that? 
A. He stalled around there for several minutes. Kept 
telling him that that would be a refusal if he did not give 
us a deep lung sample. 
Q. Did he subsequently blow into it again as he was 
requested? 
A. No, he did not. He kept saying, "The green light 
was on. That's all I have to do." 
Q. Okay. Who was holding the end of the hose? · 
A. He was. 
Q. After the several minutes had ensued and t~ese 
conversations that you talked about, then what happened? 
A. I cannot recall exactly how he indicated that was 
enough. I recall him fling or doing something with the end of 
the hose and sitting down saying, "No, I will not take the 
test." I cannot recall his exact words, however. (Emphasis 
added.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE PEACE OFFICER DETERMINES HOW 
A BREATHALYZER rs TO BE ADMINISTERED 
AND IF A BREATH SAMPLE IS ADEQUATE 
In regards to the "chemical testing" that is to be adminis-
tered to suspected drunken drivers in the State of Utah, the 
Pertinent parts of Utah Code Ann. s 41-6-44.lO(a) state as follows: 
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" ••• A peace officer shall determine which of 
the aforesaid tests shall be administered. 
~o pers~n, who has been requested pursuant 
to this se7tion to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath •.. shall have the right to 
select the test or tests to be administered. 
The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test shall not be a 
defense to taking a test requested by a peace 
officer. • • • " 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 (b) provides the following: 
"If such a person has been placed under 
arrest and has thereafter been requested by 
a peace officer to submit to any one or more 
of the chemical tests provided for in sub-
section (a) of this section and refuses to 
submit to such chemical test or tests, such 
person shall be warned by a peace officer 
requesting the test or tests that a refusal 
to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. Following this warning, unless such 
person iitUnediately requests the chemical test 
or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, no test shall be given ••.. " 
The above statute explicitly provides peace officers with broad 
and discretionary powers to administer "chemical tests" for 
alcohol abuse. Certainly such statute lends support to allow 
officers certified and familiar with breathalyzer functions to 
make independent judgments when administering tests. 
What may seem proper and adequate to an arrestee may 
be totally inadequate to a trained breathalyzer operator. 
operator should be able to administer as many ~ as he deeJ115 
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. Further, 
in a case where there is an uncertainty, an inadvertent mistake,' 
i 
-6- L 
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a misreading or even an error, an operator should be freely 
allowed to readminister such tests until a fair sample is 
obtained. 
When it was determined in the case at hand that an 
adequate and reasonable sampling of "breath" had not been 
obtained, it was entirely proper for the peace officer to 
request that appellant continue to exhale into the breathalyzer. 
It was, and is, no defense for appellant to say that he supplied 
the "required amount of breath to analyze" when in all reasonable..: 
ness he should have been required to supply more. All we are 
saying here is that which has already been said by this.court in 
the case of Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d. 241 1 243 (1978}, "The statute 
plainly and simply requires that such an accused give his consent1 
and it does not give him the privilege of imposing any conditions 
as a prerequisite thereto", or as this court said in Beck v.'-Cox 
597 P.2d. 1335, 1337 (1979), "The Implied .Consent Statute should 
be construed in a fashion to make its application practicable and 
to enable an officer to deal realistically with arrested drivers 
who may be uncooperative, and even hostile." This court went on 
to say that the statute should not be construed to place a premium 
on uncooperativeness and obstruction, which seems to be the exact 
situation that was ruled upon by the trial court in this case. 
On Page 1338 of the Beck decision, this court states that the 
overwhelming weight of authority holds that a refusal may be 
established on the basis of the conduct of the motorists, without 
an ex9ress refusal. The court goes on to suggest that the trial 
-7-
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court should take an objective look at these · 
circumstances, Whk 
is what the trial court did in this d case; an therefore his fine. 
of refusal should be upheld. Th t t' f e quo a ions rom the record she. 
that the appellant was specifically instructed to give a deep a:: 
sample so that a fair test could be obtained. He refused to do 
that and also refused to follow the further instructions of the 
officer, probably full well knowing that valid scientific inforu 
tion was therefore not obtained. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO FOLLOW 
THE OFFICER'S INSTRUCTION WAS A 
REFUSAL 
Appellant would have us believe that the acts he perfom 1 
during the time when the breathalyzer was administered were 
adequate. The cold transcript shows that appellant, with little· 
or no lung movement, merely puffed his cheeks out and blew out 
the air contained in his mouth. He pretended to be blowing, 
while all the while his tongue was over the hole of the mouthpie~ 
If appellant had acted properly and as he was directed, 
he would have completely inhaled and exhaled, causing his lungs 
to contract and cause a gust of air to be exhaled from "down 
deep." 
An expert in the field of breathalyzers explains below 
how a person is to blow into the machine and the problems that 
are encountered if one does not do so properly. 
I 
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A fresh mouth piece, or saliva trap, is then 
attached to the heated Sample Tube and the 
subject is instructed on how the sample is 
to be delivered. The subject should be told 
to blow as long as possible in order to be 
sure that the sample is from the deep lung 
area of the subject and thus an Alveolar air 
sample. Regardless of the amount of air blown 
into the machine, the vent system disposes of 
all but the last section of the predetermined 
sample chamber volume of 52.5 cc. If the 
subject does not, or cannot, produce a deep lung 
Alveolar air sample, and in reality only casses 
mouth air into the machine, then a false reading 
will be obtained, This reading may be falsely 
high or low depending upon the contents of , _ 
residual hydrocarbon material present in the 
mouth of the subject at the time of the test. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Richard E. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, Third Edition, 
Vol. 2 (1979), § 22.02, p. 22-15. 
Not only does the driver not have the prerogative to 
impose conditions or qualifications, respondent submits that 
only giving part of the test is no test at all. This reasoning 
is not inconsistent with the Beck decision of this court and 
has been upheld in California. In the following case, after the 
driver was arrested and warned, he agreed to submit to a urine 
test. The officer's instructions were that a second sample would 
be required thirty minutes later. The driver was unable to give 
the second sample and his license revocation refusal was upheld 
by the California court. 
"Certainly, by agreeing to one type of test, 
and then voluntarily or involuntarily, failing 
to submit to it, a driver may not thereby deny 
-9-
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to the state its right to any test D · t d f ····rivers arre~ e or oper~ting a vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor could 
merely thwart the law by giving a par~ 
balloon test, a partial blood sample or 
here · d - ' ' as 
.. 'an ina equate specimen of urine. The 
giving of a.partial urine sample did not satis-
fy the requirements of the law. The statute 
contemplates that a partial test is not an entire 
test." (Emphasis added.) 
Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 94 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 
(Cal. App.-1971). 
What the appellant tries to do here is elevate form to 
substance which was not allowed by this court "to elevate fom 
to substance" in the case of Elliott v. Darius, 557 P.2d. 759 
(1976) (page 761, paragraph 2), as expressed by Judge Maughn in 
that opinion. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 
A REFUSAL IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD 
NOT BE REVERSED. 
This court, in Gassman v. Darius, 557 P.2d. 197 (1975), 
said that"Each case is based on its own facts and we do not rever: 
the trial judge unless he clearly does violence to the facts as 
they relate to his findings." Of course, this court has consiste: 
ly upheld that simple rule of law and it has been reiterated. 
For example, in Beck, Id. at 1337, Judge Stewart said, 
"Since the findings of the trial court are supported by substanti-
. h t b ff· rm d Charleton v. Hacke!!.' 
competent evidence, t ey mus e a i e . -----
-10-
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l 
11 utah 2d, 389, 360 P.2d. 176 (1961); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 
2d, 133, 369 p. 2d. 290 (1962). ti 
Applying the well-reasoned law to a complete reading 
of the transcript shows that there were substantial and uncontra-
dieted facts showing that the trial judge's findings were correct 
and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the trial judge should be upheld as they 
are consisted with the evidence presented. The appellant did 
refuse by failing to comply with the totality of the officer's 
instructions and such a finding by the trial court was proper 
under the circumstances and should be upheld. 
DATED this 13th day of December, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Atto~al 
~~~~ 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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